



# Personnel Services Delivery Redesign (PSDR) Field Validation Pilot - Fort Campbell, KY **After Action Review**



28 June 2005

# MAY 2005 AFTER ACTION REVIEW

<b>Executive Summary</b> .....	<b>1</b>
Mission Objectives .....	1
General Description.....	1
Dates, Locations, Units, and Major Participants .....	2
Significant Issues and Limitations .....	2
<b>Lessons Learned</b> .....	<b>3</b>
Observations, Discussion, Recommendations .....	3

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Mission Objectives

The objective of Personnel Services Delivery Redesign (PSDR) is to deliver personnel support as close as possible to Soldiers and commanders by focusing maximum personnel and pay support at battalion and brigade level. The pilot did not address Theater level PSDR support. The primary objective of the Pilot was to ensure the PSDR concept would “work in the mud on the worst of days.”

Other objectives included the following:

- Determine feasibility of decentralizing execution of personnel services and move as many tasks as possible to battalion and brigade S-1s
- Validate, at the task level of detail, the optimum SRC-12 organization, structure, and manpower requirements to support UEx and Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs)/brigades in a modular, expeditionary Army.
- Analyze potential of SRC-12 cellular TOE in UAs
- Identify connectivity issues between S-1s and Human Resources Command (HRC)
- Identify education and training requirements for HR multi-functional Soldiers of the future
- Identify expanded self-service opportunities

### General Description

PSDR provides a roadmap for delivery of end-to-end personnel services that facilitates an evolution of personnel support, systems, and organizational structures. It accounts for changes in doctrine, organization, training, programs, policies, and procedures. The intent of PSDR is to align personnel support with the Army's expeditionary, brigade-centric force while leveraging new and evolving IT capabilities. PSDR builds the case for adequate systems, communications infrastructure, and bandwidth. Support at Battalion and Brigade level is provided through an organic, cellular, and professional S-1 staff with policy execution authority and direct connectivity to HRC. Additionally, the execution of non-deployable functions and non-tactical unit support are provided by self-sustaining garrison Military Personnel Divisions (MPD) under the Installation Management Agency (IMA). Finally, the concept includes delivery of postal support and R5 (Reception, Replacement, Return-to-Duty, Rest and Recuperation, Redeploy) down to Brigade level formations (not tested during this Pilot).

The Pilot was designed to replicate the PSDR concepts (i.e., structure, functions, policies, systems, etc.) in the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division (AASLT). The initial reorganization and startup occurred while the division was in garrison so that the MPD support functions could be integrated and validated at the same time.

The Division G-1, 101<sup>st</sup> Soldier Support Battalion, Installation MPD, and all Divisional units participated in the Pilot. The Battalion and Brigade S-1 staffs were enhanced by redistributing personnel and equipment from the Soldier Support Battalion personnel detachments. Teams from HRC, Forces Command Adjutant General (FORSCOM AG), and the Soldier Support Institute (SSI) provided training and assistance. As the pilot progressed, modifications to the S-1 and MPD sections' capabilities were identified, documented, and executed or tracked for further analysis. Under no circumstances was the conduct of the pilot have a negative impact on supported Soldiers.

### **Dates, Locations, Units, and Major Participants**

The Pilot was conducted in distinct phases. The pre-pilot phase of planning, coordination, preparation, and training was from October 2004 through January 2005. Coordination briefings with Army G1 leadership, HRC, SSI, FORSCOM AG, XVIII<sup>th</sup> Abn Corps, and 101<sup>st</sup> AASLT were conducted. Meetings with HRC, SSI, 101<sup>st</sup>, and MPD were conducted to coordinate the training required, systems access, and requirements for soldiers to obtain systems access. Train-up of the units for the Pilot began 6 December 2004 at Fort Campbell with representatives from HRC, SSI, and the installation MPD functional matter experts. In December, during the Reset Phase, all the Military Personnel Records, actions, and files were redistributed to the Brigades. The Operational phase of the pilot began 10 January 2005; consisting of monthly on-site evaluations that lasted through April. This phase was supplemented with an on-site support cell from the 101<sup>st</sup> G1, and a teleconference with all participants conducted every week to determine and address issues raised. Several visits were made by the FORSCOM Power Projection Enhancement Team (PPET) to provide reinforcement training on systems and assist in the evaluation. The Commander, SSI made several visits to talk to soldiers, commanders, and leaders at all levels. The Commander, 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division (AASLT) and the Commander, SSI declared the pilot a success in April 2005 and recommended Army-wide implementation.

### **Significant Issues and Limitations**

Issues and limitations that were persistent and challenging were:

- Local ownership and leadership from the senior HR community
- Functional and systems training attendance and adequacy
- Strength Management relationships and responsibilities
- Functional ownership and responsibility determinations
- Systems access' and administration between PAS and units
- Accountability and distribution of the Military Personnel Record Jackets

## LESSONS LEARNED

### Observations, Discussion, Recommendations

#### 1. Observation: PSDR transformation requires local leadership

**Discussion:** There was confusion as to who was responsible (on the ground) for implementation and supervision of the PSDR transformation. Valuable time was lost attempting to determine responsibilities, establish timelines, etc. Lack of an “active” on-site lead contributed to slow reaction times to the team’s recommendations, difficult coordination and synchronization of training times, and somewhat of a “we’re too busy” approach to the transition process.

**Recommendation:** The Chain of Command must designate a lead agency (G-1, Installation AG, etc.) to coordinate and execute the PSDR initiative. This team will work closely with the New Organization Training Team (NOTT).

#### 2. Observation: Units and agencies not clear on what functions they were to perform

**Discussion:** The S-1s, G-1, and Military Personnel Division were confused as to which functions were nested at each level. For example, G-1 was performing most strength management functions and Brigades did not assume their responsibility as Records Custodian until well into the pilot.

#### **Recommendation:**

a. The NOTT must provide a detailed listing of the exact functions performed by the Installation MPD, G1, BDE and BN levels. This document should be in text form vice an excel worksheet.

b. The NOTT should ensure there is no “pushing” of actions to BN that clearly belong at the BDE level or vice versa (this is also true of G-1 and MPD). MPD assumes responsibility for supporting all Non-PSDR organizations to include their records, personnel actions, etc. ICW the Garrison Commander.

c. Division of responsibilities should be spelled out in doctrine such as FM 1-0 and not left up to individual installations. Modularity demands standardization. If we allow individual installations to deviate from doctrine then we are going to run into continuing resourcing issues. Deviation may be required on the battlefield and should be a commander’s call, but at home station there should be no need. If there is, they should request an exception to policy and share their “lessons learned” so that it may be evaluated for possible Army-wide implementation.

### **3. Observation: Blackout (Reset) period not utilized properly**

**Discussion:** A preparatory or “Reset” period for training and Transfer of Authority (TOA) was supposed to be held for each BCT/Bn S-1. This event was never clearly coordinated and generally unsuccessful. Sustainment training must ensure competency levels are consistent across the organizations and to maintain and establish a disciplined system. Assumptions were made that responsible parties would develop and execute plans that could succeed. In their defense, time constraints caused a lot of moving parts to coincide and caused leaders to make decisions on priorities that did not always match those of PSDR.

**Recommendation:** Develop a Synch/Execution Matrix that backward plans training, reset periods, transfer of responsibilities from the PSB and G-1 to the BDE and BN level as well as from the G1 to MPD. Synch/Execution Matrix should be tied to training specific tasks and functions with a detailed task completion status prior to TOA. All systems and processes must remain in place with functional proponent until the NOTT certifies the gaining unit or agency is prepared to assume the responsibilities.

### **4. Observation: Cross-leveling experience**

**Discussion:** Cross-leveling of personnel from the PSB to the S-1s occurred; but without the detailed analysis of individual soldier experience. Some units were filled with soldiers who possessed only PSB and/or G-1 experience having never served at the BDE or BN level while others were filled with soldiers with only Bde/Bn experience. This resulted in soldiers not knowing what to expect or how to function outside of their comfort zones and not knowing the interactions which occur at the Bde/ Bn Level. Conversely, the soldiers with only BDE/BN level experience were extremely versed in the internal functions of the BDE/BN level did not know the operations of the systems required to absorb the additional functions passed on to them from the G1 and SSB.

**Recommendation:** Cross-leveling of personnel should occur to match strengths and weaknesses of individuals to build a cohesive and competent team which is not necessarily based on numbers, specialties and grade levels.

### **5. Observation: Training conducted in 2-3 day blocks each month was not sufficient**

**Discussion:** Having a NOTT remain on-site throughout the Training phase would enable the correct training of soldiers and facilitate the change management which must occur. Training classes should be scheduled to allow units to rotate personnel without disrupting S-1/MPD operations.

**Recommendation:** Establish a Mobile Training Team which will facilitate the transition; conduct training; develop the Synch/Execution Matrix, Program of

Instruction, and Method of Delivery; liaison with Staff Components at HQDA G1, SSI, AHRC functional proponents/branches, IMA, FORSCOM and Units.

## **6. Observation: Insufficient PAS level training for 42F**

**Discussion:** The majority of the 42F personnel moved from the PAS to the Bde S-1 did not have the requisite knowledge of tasks such as error notices and deviation reports.

**Recommendation:** The G-1 and PSB must assess this area prior to conversion. If the expertise does not exist on the installation, the NOTT must bring in personnel from Field Systems Division, HRC to conduct training. If the installation has the expertise, the G-1 should implement a local training plan/certification for the 42F and their supervisors. Training must include establishing, maintaining, and being proficient on eMILPO, eMILPO Data Store, EDAS, TOPMIS II, MS51, and DATAQUERY accounts, demonstrating proficiency with the EPASS-R tool, eMILPO reports management, PAI procedures, and resolution of common error notices.

## **7. Observation: Establishing and maintaining HR automation systems access is challenging and critical to success**

**Discussion:** Access into and use of EDAS, TOPMIS II, and eMILPO proved to be one of the greatest obstacles the units and assistance team had to overcome. While the training plan brought individuals from HRC to conduct training on some critical systems, the training lacked substance due to the short time period allotted. Additionally, the time lag between training and the soldiers gaining access into the systems degraded the training effort – most soldiers had forgotten what they learned.

### **Recommendation:**

a. During the reset period and prior to training, a team comprised of HRC, BDE S1 personnel, the local DOIM or unit S6, and NOTT members must ensure systems at the unit are loaded with the proper certificates and software and that IP addresses have been registered with PERNET. The NOTT must set the conditions for immediate access and system's use following training. Training must include at a minimum, 8 hours of EDAS/MS51/DATAQUERY training, 8 hours of TOPMIS II training, and 4 hours of eMILPO training. The training must be conducted in a computer classroom on systems that can access these HR systems. Additionally, each individual must be pre-certified to have the proper system access, permissions, and privileges required of their duty position.

b. 49R's (access requests) must be completed and processed as early as possible.

c. Security clearances (interim if necessary) must be completed and processed as early as possible.

d. AG School/HRC should provide a “smart sheet” for the units that details what systems they should have, recommended access rights (by position), and how-to on gaining accesses.

e. Installation MPD should enable BCT/Bde S-1 system administrators the ability to create System Administrator accounts. This will allow units to expand systems access capabilities and limit unit reliance on support from outside agencies. Enable BCT systems administrator with the ability to change and update accounts in CITRIX, TOPMIS, EDAS, and PERNET.

f. Assign BCT S1 personnel as BCT/Bde level TASOs and assistant TASOs. TASOs are essential in coordinating with HRC in establishing and activating accounts for HR soldiers assigned to their respective BCTs.

#### **8. Observation: Military Personnel File (MPF) handover must be a planned event**

**Discussion:** There was not a structured and proper handover of the MPF from the Personnel Services Battalion (PSB) to the Brigade S-1s. Part of this failure was an assumption that the current record’s custodian would do a by name scrub from unit AAA-162s during the handover; this did not occur. Unit S-1s simply picked up boxes labeled with their UICs and did not do a 100% inventory of the records to return those that did not belong and search for those that were missing. The units spent the next 3-months searching for missing records and never got to 100%, at which time they began reconstructing files.

**Recommendation:** Future iterations of PSDR implementation must include a detailed annex / order that lays out the procedures and responsibilities for MPF transfer. The order must include purging of records IAW MILPER Message 04-321. Handover must occur after the units have received training on updating and validating the DD93 and SGLV and training on the maintenance of official personnel records.

#### **9. Observation: Unit visit to HRC is productive**

**Discussion:** The units S-1s were invited to on a trip to HRC coordinated by the Division G1 and HRC. The feedback from the units stated the trip was invaluable in making contacts and seeing the faces of the individuals they were dealing with on a daily basis. Additionally it helped debunk the “mystique” surrounding the Hoffman building and instilled a greater confidence in the Unit S-1 dealing directly with HRC.



**Recommendation:** The units should program funds for a trip of this nature and it should occur as soon as possible following the training phase. The visit should include briefs on how the requisition and assignment process works for officer and enlisted personnel, introductions to FSD, eMILPO help desk, EDAS, and TOPMIS II personnel that work training and system accesses, and the TAG. Recommended attendees are: BCT/BDE S1, BCT/BDE WO Tech, BCT/BDE officer strength mgr, BCT/BDE enlisted strength mgr, BCT/BDE CSM and XO.

#### **10. Observation: Required - communications training for CAISI client module and the VSAT satellite system**

**Discussion:** PSDR implementation incorporates new communications equipment in the S-1 sections. Most personnel did not receive formal training prior to their JRTC rotation. Additionally, when the rest of the division went through new equipment training, the S-1s were not allowed to participate because the contractor stated they didn't have a requirement to train personnel on equipment purchased by the Army G1.

**Recommendation:** Future implementations must include training on establishing connectivity into the network with these systems and/or verification that S-1 personnel will receive training from the DA fielding team.

#### **11. Observation: Reports management inconsistent**

**Discussion:** The Bde/Bn S-1s had performance and consistency issues centered around improper procedures for processing essential personnel services or a lack of understanding in monitoring system reports and submitting transactions to correct errors (i.e. AWOLS over 30 days not DFR'd and 123 incomplete DFR packets were pending, some more than 2 years old). During the PSDR team assessments unit personnel were coached on how to correct these problems (not all associated with PSDR).

**Recommendation:** The NOTT must have personnel expertise in all areas of S1 operations to handle issues/concerns on processing or system procedures not associated with PSDR. This expertise gives the team greater credibility and shows the host unit that they can rely on the team to help solve a myriad of issues. Regulations and procedures need to be changed to change to accommodate PSDR. For example AR 630-10 states unit commanders will forward the DFR packets "through their supporting PSC" and the Installation Deserter Control Officer will verify the accuracy and complete preparation of DFR documents for dispatch to USADIP. Under PSDR, is this the G1 or the MPD?

#### **12. Observation: Stabilization of soldiers in the unit S-1s is essential**

**Discussion:** During the PSDR Pilot there was minimal turnover of personnel in the S-1 sections. The majority of turnover was due to ETS and voluntary

reclassification of CMF 42 soldiers. The latter could not be fully avoided since the Army had initiated FAST TRACK for CMF 42 soldiers due to the continuing restructuring of CMF 42. This stabilization greatly increased the effectiveness of the S-1 and reduced the re-training requirement.

**Recommendation:** Units and HRC should stabilize the key leaders and technicians within each S-1 as soon as possible.

### **13. Observation: Shifts in Personnel Readiness Reviews (PPR) and Functional Proponency**

**Discussion:** As functional responsibilities shift from the G-1/MPD/PSB to the S-1/MPDs there is a corresponding shift in management and reporting. The MPD and Bde/Bn S-1s will now be the holder and producer of information and metrics that identify trends and possible training shortfalls. Most of the units will not have the expertise in establishing processes to report these out to the leadership within the brigade.

**Recommendation:** As part of the PSDR implementation, the “losing” agency is responsible for training the “receiving” agency on all management and reporting requirements (e.g. Division Personnel Readiness Reviews).

### **14. Observation: TOE documentation can not change fast enough**

**Discussion:** With PSD’s not slated for inactivation until 2008 and S-1 augmentation not yet approved or documented, PMAD must be manipulated to facilitate PSDR transition.

**Recommendation:** Intensive management of documentation must continue throughout process.

### **15. Observation: Warrant officers maintained active communications**

**Discussion:** The Warrant officers allocated to the BCT/Bde’s maintained active communication throughout the Pilot. They exchanged emails, shared products, and met face-to-face regularly to discuss lessons learned. This communication effort greatly eased the PSDR transition.

**Recommendation:** Lead agent (G-1, AG, etc.) should facilitate/encourage similar communication forums. Additionally, during the time the PSDR team is on the ground, a recurring, formal meeting with BDE/BCT warrant officers is critical. This meeting should focus on identifying and solving systemic issues and can serve as a forum to share best practices.

**16. Observation: Sourcing of Personnel Service Detachments (PSD) for OIF/OEF requires proactive coordination with FORSCOM**

**Discussion:** There was a break down in communication between various elements that led to confusion in sourcing IEF/OEF PSD requirements.

**Recommendation:** Army G-3 and FORSCOM G-3 must be involved in the implementation plan to preclude future deployment tasking disconnects.

**17. Observation: Division of strength management responsibilities between BCT/Bde S-1s and G-1 unclear**

**Discussion:** Role of the G-1 in strength management continues to evolve. The modular G-1 is no longer authorized a robust strength management section; however, the G-1 retains responsibility to monitor unit fill, translate the Commander's intent, and perform Personnel Accounting and Strength Reporting (PASR). BCT/Bde commander's now own their own DMSL and are responsible for their own personnel fill.

**Recommendation:**

- a. NOTT must assist G-1, S-1, and Commanders to understand their new roles and responsibilities.
- b. With new systems capabilities at BDE/BN S1 section and new strength management processes delegated to BCT level, units should be able to query gains/loss data. This action will allow units to rapidly move towards independence on HR responsibilities, improve S1 visibility on gains and losses to their specific BCT DSML, and minimize reliance on Division G1 once PSDR transition is complete. BCTs must actively pull their own gains rosters.
- c. The transition of strength management from the G1 to BCT/BDE S1 must also be a formal transition event. The G1 should maintain the function until the BDE demonstrates it is capable of performing all functions.

**18. Observation: Units were unprepared for the increase in S-1 personnel**

**Discussion:** The quick influx of additional personnel created numerous challenges for the units. Some units were forced to create temporary offices and/or relocate their S-1 shops. Additional issues included insufficient furniture, computers, communications infrastructure (phones, DSN lines, LAN, FAX, etc.).

**Recommendation:** During the orientation stage of the PSDR implementation, each unit should begin planning for the additional personnel and, at BCT/Bde level, storage for the Military Personnel Files.

## **19. Observation: S-1 Soldiers need/desire additional training**

**Discussion:** Commanders and S-1's expressed a strong desire for S-1 specific training (strength management, how does the HRC assign soldiers, etc.). Majority of training provided by the Pilot training teams was system specific (EMILPO, EDAS, and TOPMIS) and to only select unit S1 personnel. The S-1 officers assigned are not AG officers and the transition to the S-1 position is difficult and challenging.

### **Recommendation:**

- a. Refine and conduct a Bde/BN S-1 Course at the Soldier Support Institute.
- b. Integrate S-1 tasks/training into the existing 42A/B programs of instruction at the AG School and NCOA.
- c. Implement sustainment training at the installation managed by the G-1 and/or MPD.

## **20. Observation: Many S-1 sections have no Standard Operating Procedures**

**Discussion:** There was a lack of quality SOPs at all levels and across all organizations. Units were not sharing their best practices and few SOPs/policies transferred from the SSB to the S-1. Soldiers were re-creating research and work.

### **Recommendation:**

- a. SSI should collect best practices and post a "living" SOP accessible by all S-1 personnel (via S-1 Net).
- b. S-1's at each installation need to share SOPs, best practices, operating procedures, etc. A G-1 or MPD hosted forum can support this interaction.

## **21. Observation: Local implementation of policies, and procedures is inconsistent:**

**Discussion:** New MILPER messages are not being promulgated from the BCT/Bde level to the Bn in a timely manner. BCT/Bde S-1 sections are not taking ownership of providing implementation guidance for new or changed Army policies and procedures. Overall, the S-1 sections are not embracing the entire spectrum of personnel management and their hierarchal responsibilities to the Bn's they support. This includes implementation guidance, training and data resolution.

**Recommendation:** S-1s develop procedures for monitoring, acquiring, and distributing information and use the Commanders and CSMs as aides to get necessary time and participation in Bn level training as well as assistance in implementing new policies and procedures. Register with the S-1 Net.

## **22. Observation: PAS Operations**

**Discussion:** Current procedures do not support the modular concept in data base management, error resolution, and reporting.

**Recommendation:** All eMILPO procedures pertaining to PAS support to the modular force needs to be reexamined by Field Systems Division.

## **23. Weekly Teleconference Calls**

**Discussion:** During the course of the pilot test, SSI initiated weekly teleconferences that included representation from the Army G1, SSI, FORSCOM PPET, HRC, FSD, the 101<sup>st</sup> G1, and other parties as needed. These teleconferences allowed a forum to discuss any issues and bring all up to date on the status of working issues.

**Recommendation:** This forum is an excellent tool to maintain momentum with all involved parties. Future iterations must include a similar process to keep all informed.

## **24. Observation: Personnel Policy changes or amendments must not get tied up in bureaucracy throughout the transition period**

**Discussion:** During the course of the pilot test, there were a number of issues raised that required policy changes or interpretative guidance from DA Army level. CG SSI was delegated policy change authority by the Army G1 during the pilot phase. This worked very well as there was no time delay when policy questions arose or a policy change was required.

**Recommendation:** Policy delegation should remain with CG SSI during the implementation phase of HR transformation. The NOTT has the responsibility to draft any required policy changes and submit to CG SSI for review and decision.